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FEBRUARY 1957

MONTHLY REVIEW

AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

THE EDITORS

REPORTS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND ISRAEL

LEO HUBERMAN

SCIENCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

PHILIP MORRISON

VOL. 8

10

World Events

SCOTT NEARING

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEEZY

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Here is our monthly bulletin on MR Press's current publishing program: (1) The reprint of Sweezy's *Theory of Capitalist Development* was ready for distribution on January 21. (2) *American Radicals*, edited by Harvey Goldberg, will be officially published on March 25 and will be sent to prepublication buyers well in advance of that date. (3) *The Political Economy of Growth*, by Paul A. Baran, is in the final stages of production and we are aiming for an April publication date. (4) *The Chinese Economy*, by Solomon Adler, has been somewhat delayed, unavoidably, in the preparation-for-printer stage, but we are still aiming for a late spring publication date. Remember that we need your help in the form of paid advance orders. If this sharply stepped-up publishing program succeeds, MR Press should be in a good position to do an even more useful job in the future than it has in the past. Whether or not it will succeed depends largely on your cooperation. (An added reason for acting now: the prepublication combination book-and-sub price on the Goldberg, Baran, and Adler books will go up from \$6 in each case to \$7 after publication.)

Financial stringency—temporary, we trust (see above)—obliges us to keep the size of issues down to 32 pages for the present. For this reason we are postponing until next month the publication of the second and concluding part of Edgar Snow's "Fragments from FDR" (Part I appeared in the January issue beginning on page 316).

Oral argument of the Sweezy case before the United States Supreme Court has been set for the two-week session beginning on February 25th.

Leo Huberman arrived in India on January 12th and will remain there until late March (address: c/o Indian Statistical Institute, 203 Barrackpore Trunk Road, Calcutta 35, India). For reasons of space, we are holding over his report on his stay in Moscow until next month. It was written before

(continued on inside back cover)

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

A Washington dispatch to the *New York Times* of January 7th reports the following incident involving former Secretary of State Dean Acheson:

Mr. Acheson drew applause at a Democratic party gathering the other night by saying he had heard the Administration's [Middle East] program described as this: "To fight an enemy that's not going to attack with forces that don't exist, to carry out a policy you haven't decided upon yet."

The formula is witty—and revealing. It provides a good starting point for an analysis of what seems destined to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In the first place, Mr. Acheson exposes the completely bogus nature of the "crisis" to which the Eisenhower Doctrine is supposed to be an answer. The enemy, variously identified by the President as the Soviet Union and "international Communism," is "not going to attack." In the past, Mr. Acheson has shown himself to be as gullible as the next man about the danger of red aggression: when he says it is nonexistent, you are pretty safe in taking his word for it. But even this is not the whole truth: it is precisely the remoteness of such a danger that emboldens the President, a cautious man in military matters, to talk so loudly about using armed force against the Soviet Union. There was no such talk at the height of the Egyptian crisis when Soviet intervention seemed a real possibility, and it is certainly no accident that it started up only after the threat of an expanding conflict had subsided and after the USSR had expressly withdrawn its proposal to send volunteers to help Egypt.

The fact is that the Middle East "crisis" is a swindle of exactly the same kind as the Formosa "crisis" of the spring of 1955. And the purpose is also the same: to blackmail the Congress and the people generally into supporting acts and policies which they might otherwise reject. The administration is obviously counting on the country to react as positively to the cry of "Communist aggression" as Pavlov's dogs did to the ringing of the dinner bell—and from all present indications the calculation will prove to be 100 percent accurate.

Let us pass on to the next point in Mr. Acheson's witticism, the

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"forces that don't exist," which is a Democrat's way of saying that he thinks the military budget has been too low in recent years. As long as this state of mind prevails in the party that controls Congress, the administration need have little fear that its proposals for increased military and economic assistance to the Middle East (and soon no doubt for more domestic military spending) will be turned down. The Democratic policy-makers know perfectly well that the "crisis" is a fake, but that doesn't make any difference to them because they are *always* willing and anxious to vote more money for imperio-military purposes.

Finally, there is the "policy you haven't decided upon yet." In matters of detail, this is undoubtedly a justified description. But in the large it is a slander against Messrs. Eisenhower, Dulles et al; and the man who probably had as much as anyone to do with promulgating and carrying out the Truman Doctrine should know it. The Truman Doctrine resulted from the decline of British power in the eastern Mediterranean, and its effect was to turn Greece and Turkey into American satellites. The Eisenhower Doctrine results from the eclipse of British and French influence in the Middle East and North Africa following the Egyptian fiasco, and its intent is to turn the whole area into an American sphere of influence in the classical imperialist sense of that term. This is common knowledge abroad and can hardly be assumed to be unknown to any responsible representative of the American ruling class. "There is," reports Drew Middleton from London, "a widely held view that the new Eisenhower policy represents a piece of hypocritical opportunism seeking to take advantage of a power vacuum that some feel the United States did its utmost to create by demanding the withdrawal of British and French forces from Egypt." (*New York Times*, January 7.) One might quibble over whether it is opportunistic to try to take advantage of a situation you deliberately created, presumably in order to be able to take advantage of it! But questions of definition aside, the view is perfectly accurate and is widely held not only in Britain but all over the world. In the remainder of this piece, we shall analyze "the new Eisenhower policy" more closely, with particular emphasis on the *internal* obstacles to its successful implementation.*

* In last month's Review of the Month entitled "American Foreign Policy" we examined the *external* obstacles in the way of the United States' taking advantage of the new opportunities which have opened up as the result of the Egyptian and Hungarian crises. On the whole, we found these external obstacles to be considerably smaller than is commonly assumed, but we expressly recognized that this did not, and does not, mean that they will be successfully overcome. Whether or not they will depends on the internal aspects of the problem with which we deal this month. This article may therefore be thought of as a continuation of and complement to last month's.

What Is the Middle East?

Dana Adams Schmidt, in a Washington dispatch to the *New York Times* of January 7th, states: "Geographically the term Middle East has no standing. It became current during World War II as a description of the area of a British Army command." This probably reflects the official Washington point of view and is intended to provide some justification for what is, as we shall presently see, the peculiar way in which President Eisenhower chooses to use the term.

Actually, the term Middle East has a much longer history and is well known to geographers. According to the Second Edition of Webster's *Unabridged Dictionary*, which is dated 1934, five years before the outbreak of World War II, Middle East is defined as follows: "In official British usage, the countries of southern Asia lying between Constantinople and the boundaries of China, esp. the countries of southwestern Asia; also, for some purposes, Egypt." In other words, the traditional usage refers primarily to an area which either borders on or is geographically close to the Soviet Union, and this is undoubtedly what accounts for Washington's present fondness for the term: if you are going to pretend to defend an area from Russian aggression, you ought also to pretend that it is an area which is accessible to the Russians.

What the administration *means* by the Middle East, however, is something rather different, though assuredly including all older meanings. According to Mr. Schmidt, in the dispatch quoted above:

The area of President Eisenhower's special aid program for the Middle East finally may extend from Morocco in the west to Afghanistan in the east and to Tanganyika in the south. This was disclosed by administration officials today in explaining why the President had not defined the area about whose defense he delivered a message to Congress yesterday.

Further, Schmidt specifically mentions no fewer than 20 countries as belonging to what he calls "the enlarged Middle East," including, in addition to those which might be comprised by the most liberal interpretation of the older usage, the following: Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, the Sudan, Ethiopia, the Belgian Congo, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya. Quite an enlargement, indeed!

These semantic questions are not of any great moment in themselves, but as every psychiatrist knows, they sometimes provide invaluable clues to unexpressed or subconscious ideas. This is surely a case in point. The United States government wants to give the impression of being concerned with a region contiguous to the Soviet Union, but its real concern is clearly with two potentially enormously rich *economic* areas: the oil-bearing lands around the Persian Gulf

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(almost wholly inaccessible to the Russians), and a vast region of central and northern Africa including the Nile and its multiple sources, the uranium and other mineral treasures of the Congo and surrounding territories, and the as yet largely unexplored resources of the Sahara and northwest Africa. This whole region, of course, is hundreds to thousands of miles from the nearest point in the USSR.

The New Afro-Asian Empire

The Eisenhower Doctrine, then, stakes out a claim to a huge Afro-Asian empire. But how is the claim to be made good? And what is to be done with the area assuming it can be successfully brought under Washington's wing? These are the crucial questions to which we must now address ourselves.

Britain and France, which formerly dominated pretty much the whole region, based their control—and still base what is left of it—on naked military force. Most of the countries were at one time outright colonies, and the rest were militarily occupied in one form or another. There was a reason for this, quite apart from British and French imperial habits and traditions: the countries were in every case mercilessly exploited by British and French capitalist interests, received no benefits (except in the case of decadent ruling classes and cliques), and could be kept in line only by the ever-present threat of violence. Already by the end of World War II, however, it was clear that these methods were bankrupt, and the history of the last decade has been the history of the decline of the empires based upon them.

It follows of course that if the United States is to make good its claim to the lands which are slipping from the weakening grip of the British and French, it cannot employ the same old discredited methods. Not that military force plays *no* part in holding the American empire together: to assume so would be altogether to underestimate the psychological and political effects of the American air and naval bases which have been spread all over the world. But military force must play an essentially secondary role, and primary reliance must be placed upon financial and economic weapons.

The successful employment of these methods, however, poses complex and difficult problems which up to now the United States has never more than partially solved. Important and powerful strata of the population in the satellite countries must derive real benefit from the imperial relation, and their position in the eyes of their own peoples must not be hopelessly compromised. No less important (at least in the eyes of the American capitalists), if the United States is to reap substantial gains from its empire, the satellites must be built up as markets for American products and outlets for American capi-

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tal. What all of this means is that United States rule must be indirect and reasonably unobtrusive, and that it must actually foster a certain limited degree of economic development and improvement of living conditions in the satellite countries,* while at the same time providing an environment in which United States business can profitably operate.

Now it can be argued, and probably correctly, that in the Western Hemisphere United States imperialism has done a good enough job in solving these problems so that it is fairly secure for some time to come and derives very real net gains from its surrounding satellites (including of course Canada, which in fact is by far the most important United States economic colony). But this does not prove that a similarly successful operation can be conducted elsewhere, and indeed experience to date tends to suggest the contrary.

It is not that the United States has no satellites outside the Western Hemisphere. Omitting doubtful cases, the following at any rate can be included in this category: South Korea, Formosa, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Greece, and Liberia. But the list is impressive in length only. In other respects it is a motley collection, not too securely held, and economically (with one or two exceptions) more of a liability than an asset. The big question now is whether the United States is likely to do better in the huge Afro-Asian area to which it lays claim under the Eisenhower Doctrine.

There are undoubtedly certain important favoring conditions. The region has enormous resources, mostly still untapped, and there is no physical or technological reason why they couldn't be profitably exploited by American capital. Moreover, as we argued last month, the rulers in the various countries concerned need assistance from the more advanced economies and are not likely to be able to get it from any other source than the United States for a long time to come. Why then is there any doubt about the outcome? Why can't we confidently look forward to a smooth takeover and a mutually profitable partnership between native rulers and American Big Business?

* This limited degree of economic development and improvement not only need not but under capitalist conditions certainly cannot and will not approach the kind of rapid and balanced development which alone can deliver the great mass of peoples in the backward countries of the world from poverty, misery, and degradation. Only socialism can do that, and even under socialism there is no automatic guarantee of success. On these vitally important questions, MR readers are referred to the forthcoming book of Professor Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth*, which MR Press is publishing in the very near future.

Bourgeois Democracy and Imperialism

The reason, it seems to us, lies inside the United States, and particularly in the structure of American political life. In the course of our history as a nation, we have developed a variant of bourgeois democracy which has certain special and deeply rooted characteristics. Not only do we have the original constitutional system of checks and balances involving the three major branches of the federal government, but we also have a national legislature which is almost wholly lacking in initiative and can accomplish very little positively, but which reserves enormous powers of obstruction to local and particularistic vested interests. The power to act positively has been largely concentrated in the executive branch and increasingly in the office of the President, but it is always limited and hampered by the obstructive power of the Congress.

This system has not grown up arbitrarily or in response to some abstract political theory. On the whole, it has reflected and served the needs of Big Business: on matters affecting the broad rights and interests of private property, the parochial vested interests in Congress normally play ball with the interests of concentrated capital which tend to dominate the executive. On matters affecting the interests of the masses, on the other hand, the whole machinery of paralysis comes into play and nothing is yielded beyond the bare minimum of concessions needed to preserve popular loyalty to the system itself. If, as usually happens, the Congress is reluctant to make even these minimum necessary concessions, a sort of counteracting mechanism is activated which brings the President and the people together to put the required pressure, simultaneously from above and below, on the balky representatives of local vested interests. When this happens, it is said that we have a "strong executive" (best exemplified in the New Deal administration of FDR), and it tends to be overlooked that this strength derives not from inherent characteristics of the personalities involved but from the overall relation of political forces which has produced a temporary alliance of executive and masses.

Against this background, the main point we want to make can be expressed as follows: the successful takeover of the Afro-Asian empire demands a strong executive free to act in the long-run, global interests of Big Business, but in an affair of this sort there is simply no basis for an alliance between executive and masses. The obstructive power of the parochial vested interests, expressed through Congress, therefore comes into full operation and indeed tends to be reinforced by the equally parochial outlook of the masses in matters relating to international relations. The prerequisites of a strong executive are therefore lacking. Under these circumstances, the executive is unable to act positively and in accordance with a rational plan, and instead

is forced to resort to all sorts of maneuvers and subterfuges in order to secure Congressional backing. But these maneuvers and subterfuges foul up the whole operation, weakening and alienating the native rulers whose support is absolutely indispensable, and aborting the long-run program which would be essential to create conditions for the profitable functioning of American business.

Let us attempt to put all this into more concrete terms. First, it is not difficult to imagine a co-ordinated policy which would result in the new empire's falling like ripe fruit into Washington's waiting hands. It would play down every aspect of the cold war and anti-Communism, both of which are distasteful and unpopular in the underdeveloped countries. In this connection, by far the most effective gesture that could be made would be recognition of new China, which in addition would be of direct and indirect benefit to United States business. It would seek an active partnership with India whose reputation as a fighter against colonialism could thus be pressed into the service of American policy, bolstering the political position of other regimes that chose to cooperate with the United States. Such a partnership would require some additional economic aid to India, but above all support for India's Kashmir claims and abandonment of the military alliance with Pakistan. Having recognized China and cemented an alliance with India, the United States would be looked upon as a genuine friend of the aspirations of the Afro-Asian countries and would be in a position to move ahead with a really large-scale program of public investment in roads, railroads, ports, public utilities, educational and health facilities, and so on—in short, a program designed to create the necessary framework for the profitable private investment which would undoubtedly be forthcoming later on when conditions were more favorable and risks practically eliminated.

There is nothing inherently utopian about such a policy, nothing that runs counter to a well-thought-out capitalist conception of United States national interest. And yet who would give it much chance of being adopted? Can there be any doubt that if the administration were to propose such a policy to Congress and ask for the necessary appropriations to carry it out, the response would be overwhelmingly negative? It is not difficult to imagine the charges that would emanate from Capitol Hill—selling out to Communism, coddling neutralists, squeezing the American taxpayer to provide milk for Hot-tentots, and all the rest we hear *ad nauseam* whenever it is proposed to do anything except fight the reds and increase the size of the airforce. Nor would there be any point in the administration's going over the heads of Congress and appealing for popular support: the whole business is remote from the interests of the vast majority

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of the people and would certainly arouse no enthusiasm.

Here is where the subterfuges and maneuvers come in. Perhaps the biggest imperial prize in history is there for the taking—so it seems to the more intelligent and far-sighted representatives of the ruling class. But Congress won't support a straightforward policy designed to win over the rulers of the area and prepare it for exploitation by American capital, and the whole project leaves the people cold. So it is necessary to have recourse to the old tried-and-true recipe of a red scare, a synthetic crisis, and a demand for more authority and money for essentially military purposes. The intention seems to be to move in behind this smokescreen, take over, and then hope for the best.

But at this point there emerges a profound contradiction between means and ends. Cold war, militarism, emergency grants of financial aid—all of this may appeal to Congress. But it is poison to the underdeveloped lands. It offends both their national pride and national interest to be treated as mere pawns in a big-power struggle. The heightening of military tensions exacerbates their quarrels with each other and inevitably invites the Russians and their allies to take advantage of these rifts. But above all it makes no contribution to improving the economic situation which underlies the poverty, instability, and insecurity of the North African and Middle Eastern countries. Quite to the contrary, it adds to economic disorder and stagnation, and thus saps the strength of the native ruling groups, including those that are most willing and anxious to play ball with Washington.

If this analysis is accurate, it follows that more than a partial takeover of the new empire by the United States seems remote and unlikely, and that anything approaching the full exploitation of its economic potential seems entirely out of the question. The historic opportunity is there—of that there can be little doubt. But given the structure and *modus operandi* of American capitalist society, there is a high probability that it will be flubbed.

We would go further and draw a general conclusion: bourgeois democracy as it exists in the United States is incompatible with any considerable further expansions of the American empire. And, we might add, a good thing too.

Failure of a Doctrine

Indications that the Eisenhower Doctrine will fail of its purpose are already legion, less than a week after its promulgation. We pointed out last month how the Egyptian and Hungarian crises had raised United States prestige and given American policy unprecedented

room for maneuver and freedom of action. Most of this advantage has now been thrown away.

"You will see," Sam Pope Brewer quotes a Lebanese politician friendly to the West as saying. "The Eisenhower doctrine will be so presented to the public in this part of the world that the United States will lose all the prestige it gained by its conduct in the Suez Canal crisis." (*New York Times*, January 5.) To which one need only add that the task of presentation will be an extraordinarily easy one: a bare recital of the facts will suffice.

But it is not only prestige that has been lost, it is also room for maneuver.

You cannot raise the red scare and at the same time normalize relations with China. It is no wonder that Knowland and Bridges, the "Senators from Formosa" who are usually leaders of the opposition to Ike's foreign policy, are predicting early Congressional approval of the Eisenhower Doctrine: it means a new lease on life for their beloved Chiang Kai-shek.

You cannot conclude a genuine entente with India while refusing to recognize China and pumping more arms into Pakistan. "U.S. Mideast Plan Opposed by Nehru," proclaims a headline in the *New York Times* of January 7th over a dispatch from India: the Eisenhower-Nehru romance of December seems destined to be one of the shortest of its kind on record.

You cannot demand of a politician like Nasser, whose prestige rests largely on friendship with the Soviet Union and a neutralist foreign policy generally, that he join the cold war against Communism. Osgood Caruthers reports from Cairo (*New York Times*, January 9) that "it is the firm belief among many political figures in the area, including some of those closest to President Nasser, that Western acceptance of Arab neutralism, coupled with a program of aid without strings automatically would sway their sympathies toward the West. This would be particularly true in the economic field." Quite so, but what is the Eisenhower Doctrine but a rejection of all forms of neutralism and an invitation to Congress to tie even more strings than in the past to its aid programs? If Cairo still harbors wishful illusions about the meaning of the Eisenhower Doctrine, it is in for an early and rude awakening.

Finally, you cannot take effective action to assist the development of backward economies within the framework of emergency military and financial assistance schemes. Ironically, this point was emphasized by the release to newspapermen just before Ike's special message to Congress of a report by a House subcommittee on United States aid to Iran during the 1952-1955 period. According to an AP dispatch

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from Washington, dated January 3rd, "The subcommittee report conflicted with what, so far, has been a fairly general chorus of Congressional approval of President Eisenhower's plan to thwart Communist aggression in the Middle East"—so much so in fact that an earlier version of the report was watered down at the behest of "a high-ranking Congressional Democrat and John Foster Dulles" (evidently an example of bipartisanship in action). And what was the nature of this conflict? The AP dispatch does not say, but one is left to surmise that the report, simply by revealing that Iranian aid had been a disgusting boondoggle from beginning to end, showed what to expect from the new "Middle Eastern" program. And indeed it does, unless Ike has somehow managed to repeal the scientific principle that like causes produce like effects.

In concluding last month's survey of America's new international position, we said:

We do *not* maintain that the United States has already developed a new foreign policy to fit the new facts. . . . The changed situation was brought about by almost simultaneous blunders of truly gargantuan proportions by France and Britain on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. But if the rulers of these countries can act so egregiously against their own best interests, so can the rulers of the United States. What's more, ours have done it, lots of times, in the short space of one decade. Whether history will now repeat itself, or whether the American ruling class will rise to the opportunity which has been thrust on it, only time will tell.

It didn't take long. The proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine settles the matter. At bottom it is the same old foreign policy that has failed repeatedly and disastrously for ten years now. It is failing again and will continue to fail in the future. What we didn't see then and do see now, however, is that it had to be this way. The failure of United States foreign policy stems neither from external circumstances nor from the stupidity of its makers. It is rooted in the structure of American capitalist society.

(January 10, 1957)

WHY NOT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA?

BY LEO HUBERMAN

We publish below two reports by Leo Huberman, one written in Prague in mid-December, the other in Israel in early January. The author would have liked to go to Egypt and hear the Egyptian side of the story, but of course was unable to do so because of Egyptian entry regulations.—THE EDITORS

North of Czechoslovakia, in Poland, in October, there was a bloodless revolution. South of Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, there was a bloody revolution. In Czechoslovakia from October to the present day there has been no revolution—either bloodless or bloody. Why not?

The bad accompanied the good in all three countries. The hated Soviet pattern of secret-police terror was imposed on Czechoslovakia as on Poland and Hungary. There was the same frightful violation of civil liberties, the same deprivation of life and freedom for large numbers of people; the same system of wholesale arrests, torture, and fake confessions; the same maintenance of ideological repression in thought and speech; bureaucracy and over-centralization were carried to the same extreme lengths. Yet, in Czechoslovakia there have been no disturbances, no students' riots, no demonstrations against the regime. Why not?

Of the several answers to this question, the economic is the most important. The economic situation in Czechoslovakia was, and is, totally different from that in Poland and Hungary. The level of industrialization, and therefore of real income, was much higher before World War II, and is still much higher today. The figures show the extent of the differences:

*Production of Industrial and Manufactured
Goods Per Capita in European Countries and the U.S.*

	Value per capita (in dollars)	
	1938	1950
France	76	91
Czechoslovakia	57	101
Poland	21	65
Hungary	26	53
United States	166	249

*(Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy,
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,
Geneva, 1954: Table A. 67, p. 306.)*

Note that in 1938, before any of them were socialist countries,

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the figure for Czechoslovakia was more than twice as high as that of Hungary, and almost three times as high as that of Poland. In 1950, when all the countries were Peoples' Democracies, though Poland had more than tripled its value of production per capita, yet its figure of \$65 was only 14 percent above the 1938 Czechoslovakian figure. Though Hungary had doubled its value of production per capita, it had not yet attained the level of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Czechoslovakia, meanwhile, had overtaken and surpassed France.

Of great importance, too, is the fact that precisely because they had reached a high level of economic development before the transformation from capitalism to socialism, the Czechs were in a position to carry out rapid large-scale socialist industrialization without imposing so many hardships as were necessary in the other two countries. What was possible in Czechoslovakia—to use a large share of the national income for investment in heavy industry, and at the same time increase the amount of consumption goods—was not possible in Poland or Hungary. In retrospect, it is clear that Poland and Hungary tried to do too much with too little too fast. The Czechoslovak experience demonstrates that only when industrialization has already reached a certain minimum level is it possible, under socialism, to achieve a substantial increase in both production and consumption in a fairly short time.

In Czechoslovakia's Five Year Plan (1949-1953) there was colossal investment in heavy industry—yet personal consumption was increased by 25 percent. In the years 1953 to 1955, there was another 25 percent increase in personal consumption. Until the summer of 1953, there was rationing; since that time, something like a normal "free" market prevails (with government-controlled prices of course), and more and better goods are available. By and large, real wages have been going up since 1948, both through increases in wages and decreases in prices. Since 1953 there have been six price reductions, including the latest one which I experienced on December 3, when I paid nine kroner for a packet of pipe tobacco which cost 12 kroner the day before.

Nor is it only the town dweller who has benefited economically—the Czech peasants have been doing well, too. As in Poland and Hungary, there was a program of forced collectivization, understandable when one considers that prior to the advent of socialism in Czechoslovakia the land was parcelled out into a large number of small plots. By 1955, 43 percent of all agricultural land, 34 percent of the cattle, and 48 percent of the hogs were in the socialist sector.

Czech peasants, like their counterparts in Poland and Hungary, complained about collectivization—in far too many instances it was done by force not by persuasion or example, with the inevitable

result that the farmers felt they were not working for themselves but for some one else. But again there were advantages in Czechoslovakia because of its higher level of industrialization. In underdeveloped socialist countries like Poland and Hungary the "price scissors" works against the peasant, that is, agricultural prices are low while industrial prices are high; in Czechoslovakia the reverse was true, farm prices went up and industrial goods went down. Both collective and individual farmers in Czechoslovakia get guaranteed prices, known in advance, plus premium pay for increased yield per acre, and low interest rates. Since 1952, average prices at which the state buys agricultural produce from both the collectives and individually-owned farms have increased by 42 percent. Unlike the farmers in Poland and Hungary, and particularly since 1953, Czech peasants have fared better and better until today their total income, both in money and in kind, is close to the national average for industrial workers.

Some groups of the population are undoubtedly worse off than before—clerical workers, bookkeepers, accountants; some are not doing too badly but not as well as in the past—doctors, lawyers, designers, and others among the intelligentsia (except those at the top of their professions).

To sum up: the majority of the people, the working class, are on the average better off than they were under capitalism.

Many of the peasants, including those who were forced into collective farms, are better off economically than they were before.

A large part of the intelligentsia, and particularly those people in petty clerical jobs, are not as well off as they were.

Taking the picture as a whole, socialism in Czechoslovakia, in spite of tremendous mistakes, is already a success from an economic point of view.

Another important difference between Czechoslovakia on the one hand and Poland and Hungary on the other is that the Czechs wanted socialism while the Poles and Hungarians had it imposed on them. Prior to February 1948, the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia was the largest single party in the country—in free elections the people indicated their preference for socialism. This was not the case in either Poland or Hungary.

In both Poland and Hungary there was an active anti-Russian tradition many years old; in Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, the tradition was pro-Russian. For the Czechs, the phrase "liberation by the Russians" had real meaning in circles outside the Communist Party. The slavish imitation of everything Soviet which infuriated the

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Poles and Hungarians brought irritation and resentment to the Czechs, but not real hatred.

Sharp Soviet practices in connection with trade caused the Poles and Hungarians to feel, justifiably in many instances, that they had been gypped; the Czechs, on the other hand, because they had more things to sell which the Soviet Union needed, had greater bargaining power, with the result that in many cases their terms of trade with Russia were even more favorable than with the West. This did not hold in the specific case of uranium for which, it seems, the Soviet Union paid below the world price. This situation has probably been changed now, but in any case uranium is not a big item in the total trade between the two countries, as coal is in the case of Poland.

A less tangible, but nevertheless important, further point is that Czechoslovakia is not a country of fighters. The Czechs have a tradition of sitting on the fence, of letting things run their course and making the best of it. They have been that way for several hundred years. For them, a militarized Germany is the real danger, the frightening thing; the evils perpetrated in the name of socialism, while unpleasant and even horrible, will work themselves out, so why fight about them?

Many changes for the better have, indeed, already been made. At first they were trivial like the appearance in the coffee houses of the London *Daily Worker* and *l'Humanité*, not obtainable previously. Now they are important—like the release from prison of political prisoners by the hundreds. Some of those released have not yet been rehabilitated; some have not yet been helped economically. And others, equally innocent of wrong-doing, have not yet been released at all.

It looks today as though the system of frame-ups is finished, though there has been no official retraction, as in Poland, of the earlier terror and the evils that accompanied it. Important changes have been announced in the legal code—changes which of themselves give an indication of the horrors that went before: (1) There is now an assumption of innocence of an accused person (formerly you had to *prove* your innocence; and formerly it was common to have a top government official publicly pronounce you guilty of treason even before your trial had begun). (2) Self-incrimination is no longer legal proof of guilt. (3) An accused person now has the right to consult a lawyer at the end of the preliminary investigation, normally a two-month period.

This much the Czechs have done, but characteristically they move slowly on other obvious and minimum steps in the direction of justice. For example, they have not yet ceded to the demand of the

REPORT FROM ISRAEL

International Lawyers Conference at Brussels in May, 1956, for *public* trials.

There has been an easing up in daily life. People talk more freely, there is much less anti-Western feeling, a greater willingness to learn from the West. While there is no free travel to the West as yet, the restrictions have eased considerably; a Czech woman who has a mother in Switzerland could, today, get a visa to visit her. That would not have been likely a few years ago.

Top officials in government are aware of the pressure for further change and are prepared to relax in many directions, but gradually, without losing face. To the intellectuals who say, "It's time for change, see what they are doing in Poland," the Communist Party answer is: "We don't like what's happening in Poland. We will change gradually, in our own way, and in our own time." And they point to the events in Hungary as proof of how right they are.

There is ferment in Czechoslovakia as in all socialist countries—but don't look for a Poland or Hungary there.

REPORT FROM ISRAEL

BY LEO HUBERMAN*

On January 3, I took a trip in Israel which I could not have taken two months earlier. Together with 53 other foreign and local correspondents, I sailed on an Israeli frigate through the Straits of Tiran, up the Gulf of Aqaba to the Port of Eilat, the southernmost tip of Israel.

We flew from Lydda to Sharm-el-Sheikh, a coastal village at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula, and then went by truck a few miles north to a point called Ras Nasrani facing the isle of Tiran. We saw there a few dugouts and six Egyptian gun emplacements. That's all there was—two six-inch guns and four three-inch guns. But that's all that had been needed to cover the three-mile width of water from the coast to Tiran. For five years these six guns had blocked ships of any nation en route to the Israeli Port of Eilat.

On November 3, 1956, the Israel Army drove the Egyptians from Sinai and captured Ras Nasrani, thus putting the guns out of commission. The sea lane to Eilat was now open—ships could move up

* See Editors' Note on page 363.

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and down the gulf to and from Israel. We boarded the Israeli frigate *Mivtach* (fortress) at Sharm-el-Sheikh, sailed past the silenced guns, and arrived at Eilat seven hours later. All ships of all nations can now do likewise.

Egypt had no right in international law to block navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba. She claimed she had the right because she was in a state of war with Israel.

A state of war did, in fact, exist. It had existed for years. *The war between Egypt and Israel did not begin with the attack on Sinai. The war had never stopped since the state of Israel was born.*

Defeated on the battlefield, in 1948 and 1949, the Arab nations carried on their war against Israel in other ways. Closing the Gulf of Aqaba to shipping was part of a general boycott against Israel; so was closing the Suez Canal to ships trading with Israel; so was the Arab blacklist of industrial firms doing business with Israel, and of civilian airlines (and passengers) landing in Israel.

All these measures, and others, were designed to cripple the economy of Israel. They were very effective and Israel suffered.

In addition to this war on the economic front, there were continual clashes with armed Arab infiltrators on the frontiers of Israel. In the period between 1949 to 1955, over 2,400 such clashes occurred, involving some 280 acts of sabotage, and resulting in the death of 360 men, women, and children, and injuries to 733 others. This was the situation before the beginning of fedayeen activities in 1955.

The fedayeen are groups of terrorists organized, paid, and directed by the Egyptian army. They are trained in the arts of sabotage, arson, and killing. Against their frequent murderous raids, Israel has virtually no defense—it would take a million men to make the 590-mile land frontier really secure, and the total population of the country is only 1,750,000. It could, of course, defend its citizens by responding in kind, or by taking organized military action as reprisals, with the hope that these would act as deterrents. Israel chose the latter course, and its reprisal actions have been headlined in the press, while the hundreds of fedayeen incidents go unnoticed outside of Israel since they rate only an inch or so in the papers.

Inside the country, however, fedayeen raids could not go unnoticed. Wells, water pumps, and cisterns were sabotaged; border settlements were attacked; schools were bombed; roads were mined; men, women, and children were murdered. (Visitors to Israel, speeding along the roads at much too fast a clip, ask the driver to slow down, only to be told they *must* reach their destination before night falls because after dark some roads are dangerous.) On August 31, 1955, the Cairo Radio gloated over a recent raid:

The Egyptian fedayeen reached but a few kilometers from your capital. . . . What hope remains for you, O Israel? . . . Prepare yourselves, shed your tears, wail and moan, for the day of your extermination draws near. . . . There will be no peace on your borders because we demand revenge—and revenge means the death of Israel.

This was not an idle boast—there had been no peace on the borders, and there was no peace. Israel wanted peace and took its case to the United Nations again and again. After each fedayeen attack and Israeli reprisal, the UN Commission investigated, made its report—and the attacks began again. At the end of April, 1956, tension had increased to such an extent that UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld negotiated a new cease-fire between the belligerents. He had hardly reached home when the agreement was violated by renewed fedayeen attacks. The Cairo Radio announced on May 15:

The war is not now confined to firing or attacks along the border, but has reached the heart of Israel and places which were believed to be safe from danger. . . . The quiet reigning in the villages and towns remote from armistice lines has turned to terror.

The first sentence in the above quotation was of great importance to Israel—the war did, indeed, now threaten the very heart of Israel. For with the acquisition by Egypt of massive stocks of arms from Czechoslovakia, beginning in 1955, the Arab countries had vast superiority in modern fighting weapons on land, sea, and in the air. On October 24, 1956, following elections in Jordan which showed a pro-Egypt majority, a Unified Command of Arab States was established linking together Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. Israeli intelligence brought news that the Sinai Peninsula was being converted into a springboard for a full-scale military attack.

Peace seemed further away than ever before. The Arabs had waged war with every means at their disposal except large-scale invasion—and now that was imminent. For Israel, the only question now was whether the battleground was to be in the desert or, as Nasser's radio had boasted, in the heart of Israel. On October 29, Israel struck.

Whether the charge of collusion with Britain and France is true or false (and the odds are that it is true), there is no doubt that the invasion by these countries two days later, after Israel had already captured the bulk of Sinai, hurt Israel. What for Israel was merely a new phase of an old war which had been forced on them, was for Britain and France an imperialist misadventure. All three countries

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were coupled together with the result that the political damage for Israel, particularly in the eyes of the people of Asia, was very great. Much of world sympathy which had been previously extended to Israel was lost, and it may take a long time to regain it.

Against this serious disadvantage, the Israelis count a number of important gains. By the time this report sees print, some of these gains may have been lost in the tangle of international politics, but here they are as I heard them from authoritative Israeli sources as of the time of writing (January 6):

(1) Egyptian bases of aggression in Sinai and Gaza were smashed, and military installations in the Peninsula were destroyed. Of course they can always be repaired if the Egyptians should ever be allowed to return. But this will take some time. So that for a period at least, the capacity of Egypt to make war on Israel has been nullified.

(2) A considerable portion of Egyptian armament was destroyed. Heaviest casualties were among tanks, guns, vehicles, military stores in the desert, and a number of planes, including Migs, which were destroyed in combat in the air. Again, this is not permanent damage because Egypt could secure speedy replacement of these weapons from Russia. But for the time being, at least, Egyptian power has been reduced.

(3) Something like 40-45 percent of the Egyptian regular army was committed in the desert campaign and fought east of the Canal. Both those who escaped and the 6,000 who were taken prisoners of war won't have as high a morale or fighting spirit as they had before the action. Nor will they find it easy to match their own experience of defeat in the desert with the legend of victory which Nasser has fabricated. They are likely therefore to be somewhat more skeptical from now on of Nasser's utterances and promises.

(4) Whatever may be thought of Israel's action, and whatever attempts may now be made to force Israel's withdrawal to the armistice lines, it seems unlikely that there will be a return to the *status quo ante*, and to a resumed blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba by Egypt. From now on, therefore, Israel can look forward to the development of the Port of Eilat and free access to the Indian Ocean with all the important trade and commercial implications of this fact.

(5) For the first time, the world was shown that it has a practical alternative to the Suez Canal. There is now no reason why oil to Europe from the Middle East must be carried through the Canal. It can be sent in tankers to Eilat, pumped through pipelines to Haifa, and from there loaded on tankers carrying it to Europe. Even with the existing toll for passage through Suez, the cost by pipeline, which could be completed in a few months, would be very much cheaper.

And there is every reason to believe that Suez tolls will be raised in the future. For carriage of goods apart from oil, the Gulf of Aqaba can become an alternative to Suez with the extension of the railway line from Beersheba to Eilat. Merchandise from the East could then be carried overland to Israel's Mediterranean coast and from there shipped west.

(6) Despite the 1951 Security Council resolution calling on Egypt to permit free passage for Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal, the blockade has been continued. Israel is under no illusions: she knows that Nasser will do everything he can to maintain the blockade. But the problem has been so highly spotlighted as a result of the Sinai campaign that Nasser may be compelled to change his policy. It will be morally difficult for the UN to countenance again the blockade of Israeli shipping, after exerting so much pressure on Israel's army to withdraw.

(7) While Egypt will probably be permitted to return to the Sinai Peninsula, there is some doubt that she will be allowed to return to the Gaza Strip—for this strip was never part of Egypt, and Egyptians occupied it only after their act of aggression in 1948 when they attacked Israel. One cannot yet know whether Israel will be permitted to remain in the Gaza Strip or whether some other arrangement, possibly under UN authority, may be introduced. Either arrangement would be a considerable net gain to Israel since the Gaza Strip was a most potent staging area for nightly attack, the largest fedayeen base maintained by the Egyptians, and the natural springboard for attack on Israel in the event of large-scale war by Egypt.

(8) The Sinai action proved to the world and the Arab states that while Israel may not want war, if she has to fight, she fights well. The campaign proved that Nasser's much vaunted army was not a match for Israeli troops.

(9) Israel showed its own people that in time of emergency, mobilization can be swift and effective, that veteran settlers and new immigrants can behave well both on the battlefield and in the cities. The public spirit and public discipline displayed in time of crisis were features which any country might envy.

(10) Israel showed by its Sinai action that it is no longer willing to wait with its hands folded in the anteroom of the slaughterhouse while the slaughterer sharpens his knife, even though the big powers may try to persuade her that the slaughterer has no aggressive designs. Israel is prepared to fight for her security. The Sinai campaign showed that Israel is a factor which must be reckoned with in any "arrangements" concerning the Middle East.

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THE WORLD OF SCIENCE

by Philip Morrison

Science and Economic Development: A Review

Some books are coldly factual, hard-boiled in tone, and heavily set with tables in fine print. This one, though it is of modest length, belongs in that meaty class.* Yet it glows with imagination. After reading, one may see a picture in one's mind, a picture of two generations hence, built up by the careful arguments of the author. For example, I see a sight sufficiently curious to tempt a fiction writer: a young Malayan computer engineer riding his bicycle home from the electric interurban station. His evening's work in the instruments plant done, he is looking forward to the TV tape on which he can watch the newly-translated *Antigone* as the outdoor theater in Penang had done it that afternoon. A brave new world, without any Bloomsbury irony, fancied, to be sure, but not at all fictional!

Richard Meier is a serious, compact, and authoritative writer. His book is in the area where we have seen more than one quasi-best-seller; but he shares neither the one-sided striving for effect of a Vogt or an Osborn, nor the popularization of Harrison Brown. This is a book for study and for reference, to be read with a weather eye out for numbers and prices. On the other hand, it is not a Woytinsky handbook, filled with hundreds of specific tables and graphs, connected only by a thin line of argument. In these 250 pages there are found about fifty tables and graphs, almost none of them simple abstracts from some governmental survey. They reflect the book well. Here is no work for the tactician of economic development who must put a place and a date on every figure, but one for the strategist who works with what is at least more or less independent of space and time. Here one may read the caloric requirements of man (and of woman, too) in Table 1—fundamental data for planning all over the world and for all time. The book's final table, more arguable, is no less typical: it lists the author's estimates of the dollar cost per person of the capital required to produce a living standard under which the young bicyclist of the first paragraph above can subsist happily

* *Science and Economic Development: New Patterns of Living*, by Richard L. Meier. Technology Press and John Wiley & Sons, New York. 1956. Pp. 266 + xviii. \$6.00.

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in his statistical niche. The total comes to about \$2,500 (in the mean); multiplying this by the number of heads foreseen, and taking into account the sizable production of the workers in the gradually growing sector of the already capitalized, the job can be done in some six decades. The time could be cut by about a third if the current United States arms budget were devoted to that purpose; but it is unlikely that the task can be done at all unless the early nest egg is provided from the savings of those countries which have already set themselves well on the road to industrialization. If it is to be done without substantial amounts of external help (and that means from the United States), it can be done only through the endless and self-sacrificing labor of a couple of generations, as indeed the USSR has already learned through hard experience.

The novelty of Meier's approach lies on the technological side. Indeed, he spends only a tenth of the book on social institutions (of his views, more later). But his notions of the technology appropriate for the high-population, underdeveloped regions are fascinating, bold, and plausible. He pins his book on an examination, not of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union as samples of the development of an economy based on technology, but rather on fundamental theory. His theory is that the elemental physical, educational, health, cultural, even comfort-inducing, needs of men can be reasonably estimated from experience and direct measurement. On this basis he projects a Minimum Adequate Standard of Living. To fulfill this standard, he would draw upon the most advanced automatic technologies, getting power from sun and atom, food from algal pools, minerals and the newest metals from low-yield ores by almost unprecedented chemical methods, heavy chemicals from sea water. His technology is brought into an underdeveloped area full-blown, in its most recent avatar; it spreads out in area and involves more and more men, but it does not progress through the painful stages of household manufacture and village handicraft to the "assembly line" and the coal-black or sulphur-yellow town. Rather it is automatic, sealed, electronic, rational from the start. The labor which leaves the land goes not into mass production industry, but into widespread construction and eventually chiefly into services. His lands never see the black country, the Homestead strike, the wasteful growth of the duplicated rail network, or the flare of the neglected gas well. Indeed, he much reduces the overall role of the classical heavy industry. The high capital cost *per worker* of his automatic factories is no deterrent; he sees rather the low capital cost *per unit of uniformly high-quality output*. Coal and steel are not any longer the sinews of modern industry; rather, they are the bony skeleton, provided as sparingly as possible. The private automobile, servant and master at once of the American

economy, appears almost nowhere in his lands. It eats gas, space, steel, and concrete. He has no space and no supplies for it.

But Meier does not follow such a path out of mere taste for the novel. His Table 18 indicates his methods, and is worth some detailed description. It is an effort to analyze the costs of various means of personal transportation. It allows for the cost of energy (fuel, for example), fixed charges, delays, time consumed in travel, and comes out bravely enough with a cost per passenger-mile. Naturally, the result can be disputed. It depends upon reasonable guesses as to the value imputable to the traveller's time. It varies among climates, terrains, and classes. But like the operations analyst he is at heart, Meier by no means avoids computing key numbers just because they are hard to be sure of. A first approximation is usually much better than a stubborn and unanalyzed opinion. It will be no real surprise to the open-minded that the dearest way to move people is on foot. "In any society where time is valued at more than 10¢ per hour, walking becomes an expensive way of moving." The cheapest ways (in appropriate climates) are by motor-scooter or bicycle (too close to distinguish at the level of accuracy of the table), about a third as costly as walking. Any society which can rationally use the labor of its people *cannot afford* to let them walk, except for leisure. A well-scheduled interurban electric rail network, powered by atomic electric stations, is the best means for medium-haul passenger and freight. It will carry people by day, freight by night. From its stations will operate bicycles, carts, car-hire, small delivery vans for the final transport link. His cities are all but continuous, for the whole world tends to become urban as the population grows and agriculture multiplies ten-fold in land utilization efficiency. The cities grow by the migration of the surplus peasantry into new communities, which he dubs "urban villages." These dot the transport lines leading into the metropolis. Around the station the new people begin to build their own simple planned shelters. They work under expert direction to pour the concrete they mix. Sacks of rice and cement flow into their hands along the rail line. They can farm the land, and gradually grow more productive. They can become construction workers, service employees, and finally enter the full life of the society. The "urban villages" merge, and a city grows.

Meier is part of the rather special little school of the Cowles Commission and the Chicago campus. The book shows this mark, no less than it shows the soberly imaginative mind of the research chemist he was and the reflective man he remains. The jargon of the econometrician and the modern social scientist are freely used; farmers are engaged in "playing a game against nature," and "macroscales" are what people had better study. "Welfare economics"

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is a kind of pun here, with more than one meaning. Most striking and by no means wholly unattractive is what one may call the method of the imaginary case study. Like David Riesman, Meier proceeds in many parts of the book by detailing a little story, a kind of parable, about how things "typically" go. Usually this is done in quite specific detail, as though he had been there once before. The little story of the urban village in the previous paragraph is a characteristic example. The method is persuasive enough, but it is related to the real world about as the movie biography is to the life and times of a French painter. Still, the stories are good ones, often with much insight. The danger is that you believe them without quite seeing why.

The book begins with three valuable long sections. These give the basis for the last section, which has been mainly the portion discussed above. They contain much data of the freely-estimated but soundly-based and theoretically-assimilated type, which has been sampled above. The first section is an account of the world's present status with respect to resources. Its main conclusions are fairly convincingly made: that the world's population will hit four billion a little after the turn of the century, that the land we have will begin to fall short of subsistence levels (mainly in proteins) by about 1975, and that fuels will go short of the needs of an industrialized world in about 100 years.

The food prediction is made on the basis of R. M. Salter's study, published in *Science* in 1947 (pp. 105, 533) and the 1947 FAO *World Food Survey*. Though some allowance was made for the opening up of new lands, this reviewer is unable to judge whether or not these studies realistically included the vigor of the "new lands" movements, for example in the USSR and China. But Meier is not daunted by shortage of land area; he outlines in agreeable detail the prospects for new sources of the limiting food factor, protein. Soybean cultivation is good but inadequate for the future, and he comes strongly to the championship of the culture of special protein-rich blue-green algae, in plastic tanks on large farms, rationalized to the hilt. These little crop plants fix their own nitrogen and can be pumped around for harvesting. The capital required is a third of that for soybean culture, and space needs go down by as much as a factor of fifty, he says, over present Neolithic agriculture. This is of course based on a projected technology, but it sounds plausible. Nor does he neglect the task of getting people to eat the stuff. "Mastering Food Prejudice" is one of the most original chapters in the work. Here there is no doubt he is an optimist.

Not so for fuels. Here he rather underplays atomic energy, though he assigns it a considerable place in the future, in concen-

trated units at large central installations, as is reasonable. But he wants to make some power from sunlight, by training the clever algae to make natural gas. That is surely feasible, on the level of prediction at least, but I would rather stick with the thermonuclear power plants, which he neglects all but completely.* Whether he regards them as improbable, or simply means to ignore them until more published data are available, is unsure. He writes cogently of the special position into which secrecy has placed atomic energy for the purposes of planning.

Transport we have discussed above; housing, a major capital item for his minimum adequate standard of living, he treats with amusing freshness. Not much area, no beds (all that dead area by day!), fewer chairs and tables, minimal kitchen and bathroom water—and a Japanese aesthetic as well. The whole thing is of course up-dated and rational: labor-saving is guaranteed by centralization of heavy tasks in automatic bakeries and freezers. The trend is logical enough; note that TV and electroluminescent lighting belongs to this view of the future. Gone are the “mansion and the single-family bungalow”; but architects can still work to “provide variety with economy and extract beauty from simplicity.” And so it goes, page by carefully-thought-out but almost always surprising page.

Finally, who does it all? Here there arises trouble. The world could do all this, but will it? He describes a little legendary case history which fits Egypt or Vietnam, but he excludes by hypothesis the wars and the divisions of actual history. It is fine to rationalize the world, but the law of uneven development still remains. Will the Chinese be content to draw their steel either from Russia or the United States? Will competition, rivalry, even weapons play no part in the growth of new industrial centers? Will managerial techniques for large enterprises really be “very much the same whether they be public, private, or mixed”?

These and others like them are questions raised by this stimulating book; they are questions which go to the heart of the matter. Here is a modern view of world planning, a view which flows out of a stream of thought wholly divorced from, and indeed explicitly rather inimical towards socialism. Socialists ought to read this book, the better to test their ideas in the context of the modern material base of production.

* On this, see Professor Morrison's “Two Notes on Fusion” in the December, 1956, issue of MR, pp. 287-289.—THE EDITORS

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Another Power Vacuum

Britain's withdrawal of military forces from the Suez Canal, completed in June, 1956, created a power vacuum in an important strategic area. Several interested parties, including the Egyptian government, Israel, the United States, and the Soviet Union, immediately began pressing into the evacuated area, thus creating the Suez crisis.

Suez is not isolated, but is part of a power complex which includes natural resources such as oil, together with trading and investment possibilities in North Africa, Near Asia, and Southeast Europe, which are even more attractive to power-seekers than the Suez Canal strip, because they offer more extensive wealth-power possibilities. In October-November, 1956, Britain and France launched a putsch which virtually wiped out their authority in this area, thus creating a vaster power vacuum than the one which resulted from Britain's withdrawal from Suez. Into this new power vacuum will move the same parties which moved into Suez, with certain additions from Asia and Africa. These converging powers will develop a Middle East crisis immensely greater in extent and volume and therefore fraught with far more danger to good order and peace than was the Suez crisis.

"World Events" has been dealing with the facts of this menacing crisis since the November issue of *Monthly Review*. It is not necessary to restate the facts here, but it is urgently necessary for the peoples of the world to realize that in the expanding Middle East crisis lie the gravest possibilities of a third general military rough and tumble.

Paris' and London's suicide dive into Suez, without securing the approval of their Rich Uncle, without the foreknowledge of their own diplomatic representatives in the area, and without adequate military preparations and reserves, not only involved their own military humiliation and destroyed their standing in North Africa and West Asia (the "Arab world") but lowered their prestige across the planet and made possible the overwhelming majorities which voted against them during the United Nations Assembly debates.

London, Paris, and Washington have joined forces to publicize the civil war in Hungary and thus to push the Middle East crisis into the background of public attention. But the turmoil in Hungary,

however violent and ballyhooed, is a provincial affair, whereas the power vacuum in the Middle East is one of the most recent and most important aspects of current world affairs. Irrespective of developments inside the Soviet bloc, the Middle East will remain a most significant, if not the chief, center of actual and potential world power struggle for some time to come.

Economic and social forces, swirling around the Middle East, are no more affected by blazing headlines, blaring radios, ponderous editorials, and political orations than are geography and the weather. Those who are concerned about world events in the near future would do well to put cotton in their ears and keep their eyes centered on the Middle East.

Four Possibilities

Four avenues offer escape from the Middle East maelstrom: (1) The formation of a strong Arab League; (2) a take-over by one of the Big Two powers, with or without a war; (3) joint action by the Big Two to stabilize the area; (4) a strengthened UN empowered to administer international waterways and to supervise the allocation of oil reserves and products. Only the fourth offers significant chances of order and peace.

Will the Western Alliance Be Mended?

One result of the ill-timed, poorly planned French-British fiasco in Egypt was the disruption of the Western alliance. Western spokesmen on both sides of the Atlantic are lamenting the breach and assuring one another that the split cannot and must not be permitted to last.

A long editorial in the *New York Times* of December 2, 1956, insists that "the most serious aspect of the Suez crisis" is its effect on the relations between London and Paris and Washington. "The free world will not crash because the canal is obstructed or even because the oil of the Middle East is cut off. It might crash, however, in a ruin beyond redemption if there were a permanent entanglement between ourselves and our democratic allies."

Continuing on the theme of "The Heritage of Freedom," the editor reminds his readers that "there were good arguments on both sides" in the Suez dispute. Despite minor differences, "the great cause for which we stand, in common with Britain, France and many other countries still looms and commands us. . . . It is not sentimental to hold out our hands to our friends in mutual forgetting and forgiving. Fate binds us together so that we cannot separate."

But separate they did over the Suez Canal issue. Despite protes-

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tations and assurances, the three countries still are separated. The problem faced by spokesmen on both sides is why did Great Britain, France, and the United States "set to quarreling," and how can the three countries be reunited?

Several issues have divided the Big Three Western powers during recent years—the integration of Western Europe, the rearmament of Germany, Washington's bargain with Franco's Spain, the Indo-China war, and the struggle of North Africans and Cypriots to be free of French and British rule. More recently, the cause of disagreement has been Suez. All of these questions have arisen within the past few years, and all of them have been threshed out in public.

There is one issue, however, which is never publicly raised or discussed by the official spokesmen for the three powers, yet it lies at the root of every quarrel. Britain and France are dependents or vassals of the United States. This position of dependence edged into public notice during the war of 1914-1918. It was a dominant factor during the 1939-1945 military struggle. Since 1947, it has been the major aspect of all London-Paris-Washington relationships.

Dependence was evident enough in the pathetically eager requests for Marshall Plan and other aid. But it went far beyond that. The United States unilaterally announced that the Pacific was to be a United States sphere of influence fortified and patrolled against all comers. In 1947, Washington assumed responsibility for the eastern Mediterranean, and by its deal with Franco Spain secured a second mortgage on Gibraltar. United States traders and investors flocked into every profitable field. A United States military leader took and kept control of the NATO military apparatus. United States naval patrols dominated the Atlantic, and United States air bases not only controlled the Western approaches to Europe but were established in Germany, the British Isles, France, Italy, and North Africa. Dependent economically and boxed in militarily, Britain and France were compelled to go to Washington for an OK on every essential decision. It was a departure from this servant-master relationship which caused the rupture over Suez.

Two centuries ago France was the Great Power of Continental Europe. In 1850 Britannia ruled the waves. Today United States productivity, wealth, and military might exceed the aggregate of wealth and might of the other private-enterprise nations.

Fate has bound the Western alliance together, as the *New York Times* notes. The relationship is not one of "freedom," however, but of economic and military superior and inferior.

Can free and equal relations be established and maintained between landlord and tenant, creditor and debtor, between those who

issue commands and those who must, perforce, obey the commands or take the dire consequences? Experience answers in the negative. In an emergency, under the pressure of hard circumstance, the master-servant relationship is accepted; but for a master to talk to his servant about freedom is the last word in absurdity and hypocrisy.

As Others See Us

Canadian "experts" are coming down hard on the United States in their evaluation of the causes which led up to the Suez crisis. Howard Mowat, specialist on Middle Eastern history and a member of the Canada United Nations executive, is reported by the *Albertan* (November 23, 1956) as listing five reasons for the Middle East upheaval: (1) Collapse of the Dulles foreign policy; (2) decline in the power position of the United Kingdom; (3) dynamic Soviet intervention; (4) Arab-Israel conflict; (5) Nasser's ambitions.

Mr. Mowat put the failure of Washington's foreign policy at the head of his list. The United States precipitated the conflict between Egypt and Israel by easing Britain out of Suez and by backing the Nasser dictatorship, Mr. Mowat argued. He charged Secretary Dulles with "ignorance and wishful thinking" in his handling of the Suez problem. Both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were quite complacent when President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 25, 1956, Mr. Mowat asserted. "Their attitude would certainly have been far different if the Panama Canal had been seized in a military coup by a dictator who had received \$420 million worth of arms from the Soviets in the last 14 months, and who had announced his intention of destroying Costa Rica and of uniting Central and South America as a totalitarian threat to the U.S.A."

Mr. Mowat suggested that the only solution of the Suez dispute would be for the United Nations to occupy and control all international waterways from Panama through Gibraltar to Singapore. He concluded: "The United States could set quite a lead with the Panama Canal."

Ominous Threat to the West

Former Senator William Benton has visited the Soviet Union, where he made a special study of technical education. Some of his observations appeared in the December, 1956, issue of *Coronet*, a popular monthly publication.

Senator Benton pointed out that in addition to the institutes and universities, which turn out more than 50,000 graduates a year, the Soviet Union has "technicums" in every field of education. Enrolled in the technicums are about two and a half million students.

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Technicums are designed to turn out junior engineers, assistant managers and administrators, and second-string personnel in science, music, and the arts.

Students who have completed the "ten-year school" and who are presumably 16 or 17 years of age, may go to the institutes and universities for five years of special training, or they may enter one of the technicums for a two year or two and a half year junior college course in the field of their choice.

Graduates from the Soviet ten-year schools are on a level well above the average United States high school graduate, writes Mr. Benton. Graduates of the ten-year school have done 40 percent of their work in science and mathematics, including 6 years of biology, 5 years of physics, 4 years of chemistry and 4 years of mathematics, through trigonometry. In addition to their courses in general education, ten-year students must have 6 years in a foreign language.

Chairman Lewis Strauss of the United States Atomic Energy Committee is quoted as stating: "I can learn of no public high school in our country where a student obtains so thorough a preparation in science and mathematics. . . . More than half of our high schools do not teach physics at all."

Coal mining, the world over, is looked upon as an arduous, dangerous and undesirable occupation. The test of Soviet technical education might well be found in coal mining.

A coal mine technicum which Mr. Benton visited had 255 students eleven years ago. The present enrollment is 2,500. Outwardly, the buildings looked old and worn, but in the course of his inspection, Mr. Benton went from laboratory to laboratory "the variety and excellence of whose equipment astonished me. Few, if any, of our own technical schools can match it." Important laboratory installations, he said, had been built by the students themselves.

Technicum students may go on to the institutes and universities. If they are in the top five percent in the graduating class of the technicum they may go to a higher school without examination. Those with lower marks may enter the higher schools if they can win out in competitive examinations. Those who get into institutes and technicums pay no fees, higher education being free in the Soviet Union.

"For most of Russia's 60,000 students enrolled in courses of study or educational institutions, graduation from a ten-year school or technicum marks the end of formal education," Senator Benton wrote. But many keep on studying. "This is why one sees the teen-agers in book stores buying books on nuclear physics. This is why in the Leningrad library I found every desk occupied in the great science

reading room. The silence was absolute, the concentrated zeal of the students breath-taking. "I asked my librarian guide, 'Are these university students?' He replied, 'Oh, no. The university has its own library; these are workers from the night shifts of the factories; we keep the library open at night for the day shift students.'"

Coronet editors presumably titled this article "The Soviet Technicum: Ominous Threat to the West" because they feel that the millions of Russian students pursuing their studies with zeal and intensity are so well trained when they graduate that they constitute an "ominous threat" to the West, with its vastly inferior educational facilities.

Freedom Fighters

Capitalist papers have been editorializing, radios have been blaring, and the picture magazines have been featuring the trials, tribulations, and death-agonies of freedom fighters in Hungary. Women are shown behind barricades. Children pose, guns in hand. Mothers mourn around the coffins of their dead. Every freedom struggle during the past century has embodied such episodes, because freedom struggles are usually associated with some form of civil war, and civil war is notoriously cruel and ruthless—on both sides.

Significant in the world-wide publicizing of freedom fighters during the past few weeks has not been the fact that men, women, and children were fighting for freedom, but that they were fighting in Hungary against Communism and the Soviet Union. When the Vice President of the United States left his arduous home duties and flew to the assistance of freedom fighters, he flew to the borders of Hungary. But what of the freedom fighters in Cyprus, Algeria, Egypt? Why this partiality?

Men, women, and children in Cyprus, Algeria, and Egypt were resisting invading, occupying armies. There, too, they gave their lives. If the capitalist press of North America and West Europe wishes to join the fight for freedom, why concentrate on one area of struggle? Why not publicize and aid all freedom fighters, everywhere?

*Not a grave of the murder'd for freedom, but grows seed
for freedom, in its turn to bear seed,
Which the winds carry afar and re-sow, and the rains
and the snows nourish.*

—Walt Whitman

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the dispatches on Czechoslovakia and Israel which appear in this issue but is less closely related to headline news and will be as timely next month as it would be this.

We have a problem which maybe you can help us to solve. For some time, we have been unable to fill orders for *The ABC of Socialism*, by Leo Huberman and Sybil May, and *We, The People* by Leo Huberman. If you have a copy of either of these that you no longer want, will you please send it to us? We will be glad to send you any three of our other pamphlets in exchange for *The ABC*, and any one of the following books in exchange for *We, The People: Man's Worldly Goods*, by Leo Huberman; *The Bending Cross*, by Ray Ginger; *The Treason of the Senate*, by David Graham Phillips; or *Out of Your Pocket*, by Darel McConkey.

We are also running short of the September and October, 1956, issues. So please don't throw them away—send them back if you aren't planning to keep a file of back numbers.

Our latest communication from Scott Nearing is from Japan. "The bookstores here are unbelievable," he says, "All of the Western classics in Japanese, English, French, German, Spanish. Karl Marx—in Japanese—in every cigar store!" Shortly after getting this note, we had a long and enthusiastic report on Scott's and Helen's visit to Japan from our good friend Tokue Shibata who teaches at Tokyo Metropolitan University and acted as guide and interpreter for the Nearings. Everywhere, they were received warmly—by college presidents and professors as well as by students—and their views on the contemporary American scene were eagerly absorbed and discussed. Not for a long time has anything brought home to us so forcefully the truth that we of the American Left, though we may be temporarily isolated in the United States, have innumerable friends abroad.

MR has had a strict policy from the very beginning never to give out the names of subscribers for any purpose whatever. Occasionally, however, when circumstances permitted, we have undertaken to mail out notices from the office to subscribers in a certain area announcing meetings and the like. Most recently we did this for the Detroit Labor Forum. Pressure of work in the office is now such that we are going to have to discontinue this practice. As a substitute, we will try to fit such notices into these notes, provided they are received in good time. Detroit area subscribers who would like to continue receiving announcements of Labor Forum meetings should send in their names direct to Detroit Labor Forum, 20574 Buffalo, Detroit 34.

A correspondent writes: "Your analysis of the Hungarian trouble in *Monthly Review*, December, is logical and valuable, as are your editorials generally. However, I wonder if the Central Intelligence Agency and the Roman Catholic Church may not have had more to do with this than they would like to admit publicly. Can you correctly advise?" Unfortunately we can't, but we are prepared to believe that they had *something* to do with it, and even that seems to be more than they publicly admit. We share our correspondent's desire to be correctly advised.

Letters of the month: (1) From a subscriber in San Francisco: "Your magazine is always awaited eagerly the beginning of each month. Though I may disagree with various interpretations of events, it still is the most stimulating and politically mature publication on the Left." That's just what we aim to be, but we don't confine it to the Left. (2) From a subscriber in Brooklyn: "I acted on your January suggestion of talking up Harvey O'Connor's book to service station operators and it worked with mine." We'd like to be able to report many more letters of this kind next month.

Ready February 11

AMERICAN RADICALS

SOME PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES

edited by HARVEY GOLDBERG

INTRODUCTION by Harvey Goldberg and William Appleman Williams

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